The County class cruiser HMS Dorsetshire survived less than 12 years service with the Royal Navy, but as Alex Clarke writes here, it packed a lot in to that short service …

Our great reliance is on the vigilance and activity of our cruisers

Admiral Lord St Vincent, (1803)¹

While the battle-fleet guaranteed sea power; cruisers put it into practice – HMS Dorsetshire, was a County class cruiser that really lived up to that duty. It was that duty which caused the creation of the class, it was the activity part though which undermined their concept of concept – as they were too big and too powerful to be built in the numbers required to fulfil the activity needed by the British Empire. 8in cruisers were the best that could be built under treaty limitations which were brought in during the ongoing psychological aftermath of WWI.²

Treaties which whilst they were supposed to reduce the competition and reduce therefore the chances of war – in reality all it did was make competition more narrow and incentivise cheating. Whereas in the past, the competition had been out in the open for all to see. In simple terms it made naval intelligence more complicated, it made nations more distrustful as they presumed everyone else was lying and it gave politicians a sense of security they could put in the papers, sold to the public, therefore allowing funds to be focused on spending elsewhere in the democracies.³ It was something which would have worked in a fair and just world, it was not however such a world.

This is the world in which the Counties came to be. The world where Britain needing to fight the world over had to build ships first of all for the sea, for range, with everything else to varying degrees being sacrificed to meet the treaty limitations.⁴ This resulted in a class which whilst in theory being equivalent to those of other nations, was uniquely British, with the advantages and disadvantages that come from such a thing. Built around the use of their primary weapon system, the 8in guns mounted in four double Mk II turrets.⁵Devonshire and her sub-class namesake Norfolk were the first to be fitted with this system. These turrets were supposed to have been lighter than the Mk I predecessors fitted to others in the class, but they weren’t. These were though of course not the only weapons carried.

HMS Dorsetshire⁶

As launched the class carried a ‘secondary armament’ of four 4in and eight single 2-pounders primarily for air defence, as well as engaging light units.⁷ However, in 1937, Dorsetshire’s ‘secondary armament’ was overhauled. Eight QF 4-inch Mk V DP guns in twin turrets replaced the single mounts, a move more than replicated with the four single 2-pounders which were replaced with eight twin-mounts, all of which made for a significant increase in capability.⁸ This would be added to as WWII progressed, mainly nine 20mm cannon, but also, as with most ships, further ad hoc additions as possible.⁹ All this was rounded out by eight 21in torpedoes, distributed in two quadruple launchers mounted athwart the ship.

With a range of 12000nmi at 12knts and carrying 1,100 tons of armour displaced around the vital parts of the ship they were a well-designed well balanced “A” Type cruiser to the “B” Type cruiser of HMS Exeter.¹⁰ It wasn’t though just their 8in turrets which Dorsetshire would share with Exeter, it was also her moment of fame, coming in the chase of a German Surface Raider and her fate, at the hands of the Japanese.¹¹ To properly frame though, these moments of war time triumph and desolation, to understand her peacetime conception and function, it is necessary to consider not just the cruiser, as either a definition or a set of duties, but the reasoning behind and for those duties. A discussion which inevitably leads to discussing more than just war.

One of the participants in the Art of War by Sun Tzu, Mei Yaochen, makes the point “whether you live or die depends on the configuration of the battle-ground; whether you survive or perish depends on the way of battle”.¹² Now this would not have been known to Henry VII when he made a decision as to whether to buy a warship or a tapestry, but it does neatly some up that the often cited modern discussion of shaping the battlefield before the battle begins, or even conceived of, has been around a very long time.¹³ Shaping though is more than just about how many warships there are, what they are equipped with or even where they are; it’s about relationships, it’s about image or perception as much as reality, it is about ‘winning the peace’, so that the war is won before it even begins. Cruisers were, are still in terms of duties, what do this for navies, for nations maritime or other which seek global reach.

The duties are separate from the definition, because any ship can be used for cruising – in fact traditionally it was done by vessels called Frigates in the age of Nelson, sometimes even 3rd or 4th rate ships of line would be employed for some stations.¹⁴ It was not until the Victorian era, that purpose built ships, called cruisers, started to appear – they were as big as, in fact as often bigger than, the battleships. They were built for range, for speed, for presence. They needed enough firepower to deal with the likely equivalents they would match up against, but they were, just as in the days of Nelson, not designed to take a place in the line of battle; again sacrificing weight of armour though, rather than weight of armament, for those characteristics. This mattered because the line of battle was of course was still very relevant at time, in fact would reach its peak of critical thinking much later in WWI; when that very important distinction would be forgotten, to the detriment of some otherwise very good, very useful ships.¹⁵

The reason they were not for the line of battle is that the cruising ethos was about exercising control of the sea, rather than gaining it. In peacetime they were about presence, about being the visible symbol of the fleet and by extension the nation; they were the embodiment of those who show up are those who get to make the decisions. In war time cruisers were about economic warfare, both defensive and offensive. Finding the enemy, finding out their composition and giving that vital intelligence to the fleet commander who would then engage the enemy with the fleet. This meant that in war or peace, cruisers whether by role or design have always been worth their weight in gold. It also though helps explain the events of WWI.

Battle cruisers were lost because of their name, the prefix was wrong, they should have been Dreadnought Cruisers, as those ships with lineage following on more directly from HMS Dreadnought were described as Dreadnought Battleships. The name is what lead to many considering them interchangeable with battleships (after all both had ‘Battle’ in their descriptive name…), when in fact they were still cruisers – big ones, the most powerful ones, but still cruisers depending upon speed and manoeuvre for survival. WWI disabused many of the notion that speed was armour, but still in the inter-war years some navies treated their cruisers as surrogate battleships – designing them as such. The RN did not, the RN had an empire to defend, the Admiralty calculated a minimum need for seventy cruisers to do this, in peace and war, the shape and form of those cruisers though – that was a more subjective debate.

It was subjective because of the impact of Treaties, because of the weighting of capabilities and the emergence of technologies; especially welding, which saved so much weight in comparison to riveting allowing for the inclusion of other new things in the new designs. Unfortunately this arrived too late for the Counties.¹⁶ They still though were well balanced ships, for cruising operations as understood and theorised when they were constructed.

HMS Dorsetshire’s life started in September 1927 when she was laid down at Portsmouth dockyard, commissioned in September 1930, she was first attached to the Atlantic fleet and served as the flagship of the prestigious 2nd Cruiser squadron.¹⁷ In this role she in turn carried three admirals, Rear Admiral Mathew Best was the first, he held the role of squadron commander 1929-31; Vice Admiral Edward Astley-Rushton was next, 1931-2; then it was Rear Admiral Percy H.L. Noble, 1932-5.¹⁸ It was during the last officer’s tenure in post that Dorsetshire moved on, becoming the Flagship of the Africa Station, therefore beginning her role as an ‘Imperial’ cruiser.¹⁹ Up till then fleet work had been the priority, a life revolving around exercises and preparations for war; baring the excitement of the Invergordon Mutiny of course. It was also a time when it was being realise that Heavy Cruisers in a main fleet, whilst necessary as force multipliers to make up for the much smaller and older Battle Fleet, were not as fully utilised as they were in cruising stations. A main fleet would have Battleships, maybe even Battlecruisers, which meant Heavy Cruisers were not the biggest guns and possibly not the fastest. In contrast in the distant stations they were often ‘it’, they were the closest big ship, they were ultimate on call status symbol, the most potent representation of British power, majesty and eminence. In the fleet, as was said, they were necessary, away from the fleet they were vital.

The transition from one to the other for HMS Dorsetshire came in 1933, when she was transferred to the Africa Station, serving with the famed Antarctic Explorer and then Vice Admiral Edward Ratcliffe Garth Russell Evans; this was prior to his becoming Rector of Aberdeen University or being made the 1st Baron Mountevans.²⁰Africa station was not the Wild West high stakes poker that the China Station was starting to become, but it was still a critical station. British imperial power was always far more a game of image than strength, cruisers were a key part of that, especially the big impressive Counties with classically beautiful lines and their obvious well balanced armament. They had amble space for hosting functions, especially fore and aft under the guns if the weather permitted.²¹ As said though, Africa, whilst a demanding station, was fairly straight forward, this came to an end through in 1935 when Dorsetshire went for refit, before deploying to the China Station in 1936.

The China Station in the late 1930s has already been described in colourful terms, but it still needs further scene setting. China was collapsing under the weight of Japanese attacks, an economy riven by every form of malignancy both internal and external, but most importantly it was a nation which hadn’t succeeded in building itself into one, factionalism was rampant and taken advantage of by all. Japan, already mentioned, but worthy of its own sentence was world number three by treaty, it was hungry for raw materials, for recognition of its status, for its ‘rightful’ place in the world and most importantly it was a nation which was growing used to victory, giving it confidence in itself and its eminence.²² Alongside these nations, were a raft of colonial possessions of various forms, ranging from self-governing dominion to limp vassal; making sometimes the local pace of decision making problematic for those seeking to respond to aggression in an appropriate timely manner as they need to consult with distant, often unfamiliar, authorities for permission to act. This was something Japan especially liked to take advantage of, so whilst Dorsetshire never really had its own Tsingtao moment, it certainly did have its fair share of issues.²³

In the China Station Dorsetshire was part of 5th Squadron, a unit she would serve with right up to the beginning of WWII.²⁴ One of three Counties on station, the other two being her sisters HMS Kent and HMS Cornwall (a ship whose fate would be entwined with Dorsetshire’s) – a group rounded out by the brand new Town class cruiser, HMS Birmingham.²⁵ Supported by a carrier, only a small one, but HMS Eagle and her crew did thee best to make up for in pride and history what she lacked in size, speed and air group quantity/quality.²⁶ A force which by WWII was rounded out by most of a flotilla of early 1930s ‘D’ class destroyers.²⁷ This was the force which was supposed to deter Japanese aggression in the Far East, whilst a war was fought in Europe. If the war had stayed in Europe this might have been possible, with a lot of fancy foot work; if the war had stayed in the Atlantic, it would have been harder, but possible. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the War Plans of the China Station, the linking with the East Indies force, the moment the Graf Spee hit the Indian ocean the China Station vessels were no longer free to just react to Japan.²⁸

In October 1939 after being transferred to the East Indies Station, Dorsetshire, Cornwall and Eagle, along with the Australian destroyer, HMAS Waterhen and Vendetta, were almost immediately formed into Force I, based on Colombo, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) with the task of sweeping the Indian Ocean of Surface raiders.²⁹ However, this didn’t last long and almost as soon as December arrived Dorsetshire was detached, first to Simonstown, South Africa; then to the Falkland Islands, on route being diverted to the River Plate to support the RN ships off Montevideo. ³⁰ In simple terms Dorsetshire transferred through three different stations and covering a distance in excess of 12,000nm (just between stations, let alone including cruising) whilst traversing half the world in pursuit of a surface raider. Perhaps more than the ships sunk, it was these operational impacts which were Graf Spee’s greatest success.³¹ Dorsetshire would stay in the South Atlantic Station till she needed a refit in June 1940, which took place at HM Devonport. It wasn’t a long refit, afterwards she went straight back to operations, mainly again in the South Atlantic – in fact other than covering French ships, her next involvement in a major operation was against another raider, Bismarck.

Dorsetshire is not a name always remembered for her role in the operations, she wasn’t sunk, she didn’t really arrive soon enough to take part in any of the big artillery duels – but it was her who fired the final torpedoes, that made sure/hastened the trip to the bottom for Germany’s finest surface raider. When Bismarck got loose, like Captain Philip Vian’s Tribal class destroyers, Dorsetshire was escorting a convoy, SL 74, bound from Freetown, Sierra Leone, to the UK.³² Like Vian, Captain Benjamin Martin, without orders, handed over escort to (in this case) an armed-merchant cruiser, Bulolo (Vian had left a ‘C’ class anti-air cruiser with his convoy) and pointed his ship in the direction of action – correctly surmising, as Ludovic Kennedy points out in his work Pursuit – Sinking of the Bismarck, that in Neslonian fashion, “No Captain can do very wrong if he lays has ship alongside that of the an enemy”.³³ It was actually with help of Captain Vian that Dorsetshire found Bismarck in the end, although as that ship was already heavily engaged by the battleships HMS Rodney & HMS King George V along with Dorsetshire’s sister, HMS Norfolk, she did manage to get a few shots in.³⁴ It was though prophetic, because by being late it was Captain Martin’s ship which still had torpedoes left, so when Admiral Tovey signalled “Any Ships with Torpedoes to close Bismarck and torpedo her”, he was already manoeuvring for such a mission – closing to a mile and half she fired two from starboard, then circled and fired another from port at just over a mile – all three torpedoes hit. ³⁵  This was of course not the end of things though, she and the Tribal class destroyer, HMS Maori, hung around picking up survivors until a submarine was thought to be sighted – at which point prudence dictated getting out of the area as fast as possible. ³⁶

These counter raider operations were both testimony to the weakness and the strength of the British Empire, its weakness was like the modern economy, it was a global system – disruption in trade or rather the movement of goods, capital or people, anywhere across the world would have an impact. The RN had consciously focused itself on prevent such an occurrence, that was the root of the 8in Heavy Cruiser vs 6in Light Cruiser debate, but it was never enabled by the governments of the day to even reach the level of strength it asked for, let alone what it probably needed to do the role.³⁷ This was in part due to political priorities, but also in part due to the miss understanding of technology; new technology was thought to be replacing or supplanting old and in some cases of course it did, but it was always more nuanced than necessarily it was perceived to be. Firstly, the readiness of that technology to actually supplant the existing methodology. Secondly, the infrastructure to support the deployment of that technology. Thirdly, most crucially, the reality of whether that technology could be supplanted, whether in fact the new technology would either enhance or combine with the existing technology to achieve something completely different from what was theorised. A repetition of such a sequence has been seen lots of times in history, with events being focused on that on surface provide ‘proof’ of the supplanting – the next event in Dorsetshire’s story, her sinking, is often used to illustrate the coming of air power, the coming of the carrier as the new capital ship. When in fact it is perhaps a better illustration of the weakness of the British position (which was a navy that realised it could have to fight the world over, but had not been funded or supplied with really the appropriate infrastructure and depth, to fight a completely global multi-opponent war) and the challenges it forced upon commanders, some of whom rose to the occasion, some tried and were unlucky, others despite all prior indications proved themselves to be human.

Not long after the Bismarck operation was over, in June 1941 Dorsetshire went in for a refit, during which she gained air search radar; she also had other things done to improve the efficiency of her anti-air fit. In simple terms the RN was using the best technology it had available to make as many ships capable of protecting themselves against the rapidly evolving threat; after all the pace of technological development which had already been apparent in the 1930s, had only escalated with the commencement of conflict. For starters the Eastern Fleet 1942 deployed to the Indian Ocean was not the Mediterranean or Home Fleet of the early war, although it shared several key constituents with that Mediterranean Fleet, it was certainly not what the Pacific Fleet would become.³⁸ It was centred on one fast battleship, HMS Warspite, and four much slower ‘R’ class battleships; alongside this it had three carriers, the still pretty new HMS Indomitable, the not quite so new HMS Formidable and the practically WWI vintage HMS Hermes; crucially though, it had only seven cruisers, sixteen destroyers (none of them Tribal class) and just three submarines.³⁹ Without a significant land or sea based air search capability, the obvious lack of smaller ships and no ability to mount a proper submarine tripwire at the strategic choke points, Admiral Somerville’s fleet at the time probably inspired in him similar contemplations to that of Admiral Nelson after the Battle of the Nile, “Was I to die this moment, ‘Want of Frigates’ would be found stamped on my heart”.⁴⁰ Still though, upon hearing the Japanese were coming to attack Somerville put his fleet to sea in the hope of finding and engaging them.⁴¹

For three nights Admiral Somerville conducted sweeps, hoping to spring a trap – a night attack, he knew the Japanese were weak in night operations and that his aircrew were well versed in them; or were at least able to risk them with a good chance of success.⁴²  Fighting in day time was known to ill-advised due to Japanese numerical superiority, in fact all operations were governed by three considerations⁴³:

1. The total defence of the Indian Ocean and its vital lines of communication depended on the existence of the Eastern Fleet. The major policy of keeping this Fleet “in being” – already approved by the Admiralty – was paramount.
2. The only hope of dealing the enemy an effective blow was by means of a carrier-borne striking force, preferably at night. To operate the carriers escorted by the Warspite out of supporting distance of the 3^rd Battle Squadron in any area where enemy battleships might be encountered would offer the Japanese an opportunity to cripple our only offensive weapon.
3. Interception of the enemy either before or during the anticipated raid on Colombo on 5^th April was not possible, but the shore-based aircraft at Ceylon might damage some enemy ships, which could be attacked later, or something might occur to postpone the Japanese air raid by 24 hours.

This was Somerville’s mind-set when he went to sea on the 30^th of March, it was the mind-set which meant that Dorsetshire, mid-refit, had to put sea – joined Task Force A on 1^st of April – the fast force, because it wasn’t only numbers against the RN.⁴⁴  Somerville knew the weakness of his fleet was not just numbers – it was also the legacy of the interwar naval treaties, compounded by the financials of those years, all made worse by the war that had already been raging for three years. So his force was divided, into the trap force and the supporting force – or fast and slow⁴⁵:

“Force “A,” a fast division composed of the Warspite, Indomitable, Formidable, Cornwall, Emerald, Enterprise and six destroyers, was to operate under his immediate orders, while Force “B,” consisting of the remainder of the Fleet, under Vice-Admiral Willis, kept within supporting distance to the westward of him.”

Dorsetshire was the critical second 8in gun heavy cruiser available for the fast task force, there were no other options, so it was pulled from refit – something an Admiral has strategic and as by the book as Somerville would not do, under any but the direst circumstances. This was truth of the fleet in the Indian Ocean in 1942, when the Japanese came calling. Unfortunately though the timeline on the intelligence estimates was wrong.⁴⁶  So when nothing had happened by the 2^nd April, after three nights of sweeps to try to find the Japanese had proved fruitless, Somerville took a decision and the two heavy cruisers of Task Force A were despatched to Ceylon; Cornwall to escort a convoy of troops withdrawn from the Far East to reinforce Australia against the Japanese threat and Dorsetshire to finish her refit.⁴⁷  While they did this, a majority of the rest of the Eastern Fleet withdrew to Addu Atol – more commonly called the Maldives, centrally located in the Indian Ocean, great for fleet security as finding it would be far more difficult than finding Ceylon – which unfortunately it was 600miles from, so it meant the fleet was not able to help at all if an attack struck there by surprise.

The history is well known by many, this proved a bad decision for Somerville; worse than that, it took just 48 hours to find out, when further reports of Japanese movements reached him.⁴⁸  The fleet had only arrived in Addu Atol on the 4^th, they had no ability to get ready in time for sailing before the 5^th – which meant they’d never reach Ceylon in time for the revised attack date.⁴⁹ Still though, Somerville put to sea – even with the 1^st priority being to keep ‘his fleet in being’, even knowing the odds and the chances of success, Somerville chose to try to engage the enemy more closely, the trouble was the clock was already way ahead of him. Even as Task Force A was surging to sea, even as Cornwall and Dorsetshire were already making their way south at 22 knots – having been ordered to sea at 22:00hrs on the 4^th (they’d only arrived at Colombo at 10:00hrs that morning), while the old carrier Hermes and the Australian destroyer HMAS Vampire were ordered to leave Trincomalee as soon as they had fuel.⁵⁰

Cornwall and Dorsetshire actually maintained 23knots, reasoning probably that their Commander in Chief would not be upset with celerity; after receiving a report of strong enemy forces to eastward of them, at 06:48hrs, speed was increased to 27.5knots – the highest Cornwall was capable of.⁵¹ Unfortunately it was a calm day, with no cloud cover, visibility was perfect; in the age of a sail it would have been perfect, in WWII with an enemy fleet baring down and no supporting fleet, Captain Agar (Dorsetshire) and Captain Manwaring (Cornwall) were trying to get to a supporting fleet as quickly as possible. At 11:00hrs an aircraft was sighted, but not identified and no report was made of it; two hours later, two more were seen, one identified by silhouette as friendly, the other as not.⁵² It was after the second visit, that Captain Agar, the Senior Officer, decided to break radio silence and report the shadowing – aiming to warn the Task Force “A” that the enemy was near.⁵³ At 13:40hrs, 40 minutes after the second sighting, a formation of three dive bombers attacked. They hit Cornwall first, but soon another formation was diving on Dorsetshire, releasing bombs at low altitude, no fighter interference and only two cruisers on their own. Hit repeatedly by overwhelming numbers of aircraft they had no chance.⁵⁴The ships were both sunk with minutes, in fact the attack was so quick and so heavy that main anti-air armament on both ships was put of action with only a few rounds being fired.⁵⁵

HMS Dorsetshire & HMS Cornwall being bombed. This photo was taken from a Japanese aircraft.⁵⁶

1. Hill-Norton, P. & Decker, J., 1982. Sea Power. London: Faber and Faber Ltd, p.111
2. Jordan, J., 2011. Warships after Washington; the development of the five major fleets 1922-1930. Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing.
3. Churchill Archives – Roskill: 7/187, 1968; Churchill Archives – Roskill: 8/9, 1970; TNA – T 161/243 (25613), 1924-5; TNA – T 161/243 (25613a), 1924-5; TNA – T 161/243 (25613b), 1924-5; TNA – T 161/243 (25613c), 1924-5; TNA – T 161/243 (25613d), 1924-5; TNA – T 161/243 (25613e), 1924-5; TNA – T 161/243 (25613f), 1924/25
4. Friedman, N., 2010. British Cruisers; Two World Wars and After. London: Seaforth Publishing, pp. 105-8; Morris, D., 1987. Cruisers of the Royal and Commonwealth Navies. 1st ed. Liskeard: Maritime Books, pp. 182-6; Jordan, 2011
5. The same as were fitted to York class in fact (Clarke, A., 2018i. Royal Navy Cruisers (1): HMS Exeter, Atlantic to Asia!. [Online] Available at: https://globalmaritimehistory.com/royal-navy-cruisers-1-hms-exeter-atlantic-asia/ [Accessed 30 March 2018]; Friedman, 2010, p. 107; Morris, 1987, p. 182 & 187)
6. Mason, G. B., 2010. HMS DORSETSHIRE – County-type Heavy Cruiser. [Online] Available at: http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-06CA-Dorsetshire.htm[Accessed 2 April 2018]
7. Friedman, 2010, pp. 105-8; Morris, 1987, pp. 182-6)
8. Friedman, 2010, pp. 105-8 & 121; Morris, 1987, pp. 182-6)
9. Friedman, 2010, pp. 105-8; Morris, 1987, pp. 182-6)
10. Friedman, 2010, pp. 105-8 & 121; Morris, 1987, pp. 182-6)
11. Kennedy, L., 1974. Pursuit; The Sinking of the Bismarck. London: Collins, p. 209; Stephen, M., 1999. Sea Battles in close-up: World War 2. London: Ian Allan Ltd, p. 97
12. Sun Tzu, 2003. The Art of War, Complete Texts and Commentaries. London: Shambhala Publications, Inc , p.41
13. Richardson, G., 2002. Renaissance Monarchy, The Reigns of Henry VIII, Francis I and Charles V. London: Hodder Headline Group
14. Rodger, N., 2004. The Command of the Ocean. London: Penguin Books
15. Massie, R. K., 2005. Castles of Steel. London: Pimlico
16. Johnman, L. & Murphy, H., 2005. Welding and the British Ship Building Industry. In: R. Harding, ed. The Royal Navy 1930 – 2000; Innovation and Defence. Abingdon: Frank Cass, pp. 89-116
17. Morris, 1987, p. 185
18. Morris, 1987, p. 185
19. Mackie, C., 2018. I: Royal Navy Senior Appointments, 1865-. [Online] Available at: www.gulabin.com/[Accessed 30 March 2018]; The Dreadnought Project, 2017. Second Cruiser Squadron (Royal Navy). [Online]
    Available at: http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/Second_Cruiser_Squadron_(Royal_Navy) [Accessed 30 March 2018]
20. Mackie, 2018; The Dreadnought Project, 2017
21. For an example of what sort of functions they might engage in, the story of HMS Ashanti from the Tribal series is a good starting place https://globalmaritimehistory.com/tribal-class-destroyers-3-hms-ashanti-soft-power-entrepreneur/
22. Jordan, 2011
23. Clarke, A., 2018ii. The Royal Navy and the Far East in the 1930s: Promoting Stability and Preserving the Peace on a Budget. [Online] Available at: https://www.swwresearch.com/single-post/2018/11/02/The-Royal-Navy-and-the-Far-East-in-the-1930s-Promoting-Stability-and-Preserving-the-Peace-on-a-Budget [Accessed 17 November 2018]
24. TNA – ADM 187/1, 1939
25. TNA – ADM 187/1, 1939
26. TNA – ADM 187/1, 1939
27. TNA – ADM 187/1, 1939
28. TNA – ADM 116/3119, 1933-35; TNA – ADM 116/4635, 1942
29. Mason, 2010
30. Mason, 2010
31. Clarke, A., 2014. Sverdlov Class Cruisers, and the Royal Navy’s Response. [Online] Available at: https://globalmaritimehistory.com/sverdlov_class_rn_response/ [Accessed 11 February 2018]
32. Kennedy, 1974, pp. 155 & 201-9; Mason, 2010; TNA – ADM 234/509, 1941; TNA – ADM 234/510, 1941; TNA – ADM 367/137, 1941; Stephen, 1999, pp. 88-9. HMS Tartar (https://globalmaritimehistory.com/tribal-class-destroyers-4-hms-tartar-the-survivor/) & HMS Eskimo (https://globalmaritimehistory.com/tribal-class-destroyers-part-7-ii-hms-eskimo-legend-forged-in-steel-made-real-by-the-leaders-forged-within/)
33. Kennedy, 1974, pp. 155 & 201-9; Mason, 2010; TNA – ADM 234/509, 1941; TNA – ADM 234/510, 1941; TNA – ADM 367/137, 1941. HMS Tartar (https://globalmaritimehistory.com/tribal-class-destroyers-4-hms-tartar-the-survivor/) & HMS Eskimo (https://globalmaritimehistory.com/tribal-class-destroyers-part-7-ii-hms-eskimo-legend-forged-in-steel-made-real-by-the-leaders-forged-within/)
34. Kennedy, 1974, pp. 155 & 201-9; Mason, 2010; TNA – ADM 234/509, 1941; TNA – ADM 234/510, 1941; TNA – ADM 367/137, 1941; Stephen, 1999, pp. 92-7. HMS Tartar (https://globalmaritimehistory.com/tribal-class-destroyers-4-hms-tartar-the-survivor/) & HMS Eskimo (https://globalmaritimehistory.com/tribal-class-destroyers-part-7-ii-hms-eskimo-legend-forged-in-steel-made-real-by-the-leaders-forged-within/)
35. Kennedy, 1974, pp. 155 & 201-9; Mason, 2010; TNA – ADM 234/509, 1941; TNA – ADM 234/510, 1941; TNA – ADM 367/137, 1941. HMS Tartar (https://globalmaritimehistory.com/tribal-class-destroyers-4-hms-tartar-the-survivor/) & HMS Eskimo (https://globalmaritimehistory.com/tribal-class-destroyers-part-7-ii-hms-eskimo-legend-forged-in-steel-made-real-by-the-leaders-forged-within/)
36. Kennedy, 1974, pp. 155 & 201-9; Mason, 2010; TNA – ADM 234/509, 1941; TNA – ADM 234/510, 1941; TNA – ADM 367/137, 1941. HMS Tartar (https://globalmaritimehistory.com/tribal-class-destroyers-4-hms-tartar-the-survivor/) & HMS Eskimo (https://globalmaritimehistory.com/tribal-class-destroyers-part-7-ii-hms-eskimo-legend-forged-in-steel-made-real-by-the-leaders-forged-within/)
37. Clarke, A., 2018i
38. (TNA – ADM 234/331, 1942; Wragg, D., 2011. The Pacific Naval War 1941-1945. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Maritime; Boyd, A., 2017. The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters; Lynchpin of Victory, 1935-1942. Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing; Cunningham, A. B., 1951. A Sailor’s Odyssey; the Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope K.T. G.C.B. O.M. D.S.O.. London: Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd; Dannreuther, R., 2006. Sommerville’s Force H; The Royal Navy’s Gibraltar-based Fleet, June 1940 to March 1942. London: Aurum Press Ltd)
39. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942
40. The War Times Journal, 2003. Letters and Dispatches of Horatio Nelson. [Online] Available at: http://www.wtj.com/archives/nelson/1798_08b.htm[Accessed 28 April 2018]
41. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942
42. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942
43. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942
44. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942; Mason, 2010
45. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942
46. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942; Mason, 2010
47. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942; Mason, 2010
48. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942; Mason, 2010
49. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942
50. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942
51. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942
52. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942; Mason, 2010
53. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942; Mason, 2010
54. In fact the Japanese managed a text book perfect attack, “Captain Agar remarked that their tactics were facilitated by the ships being on a southerly course, thus enabling them to combine the advantages of attacking down sun and from ahead – the cruisers’ blind spot for A/A defences” (TNA – ADM 234/331, 1942)
55. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942; Mason, 2010
56. WWII Today, 2017. Apr 5 1942: HMS Dorsetshire and HMS Cornwall sunk. [Online] Available at: http://ww2today.com/5th-april-1942-hms-dorsetshire-and-hms-cornwall-sunk [Accessed 20 03 2018]
57. TNA-ADM 234/331, 1942; Mason, 2010