Royal Navy Cruisers (3): HMS Edinburgh, a golden life

“Si vis Pacem, Para Bellum”

When HMS Edinburgh was ordered in 1936, at a time when war was feared, perhaps even predicted, but was by no means foreseen or even being prepared for on the scale it would be. Certainly no one knew that this ship, this proud cruiser, conceived and constructed in peace, would know almost nothing, in her relatively short life, but the restless energy and constant timbre of war. Edinburgh, along with HMS Belfast comprised the last batch of Town class cruisers – the biggest of these vessels, designed with an enhancement of the classes’ mission in mind.

A short video from Dr Alex Clarke accompanies this post…

The conception of the Town class cruisers was at least in publicised theory anti-surface raider, they were postulated as ships which would hunt the enemy down. Now this may seem odd for a navy which was bound so closely after World War I experience to convoy, it is – focusing on cruisers for those duties, i.e. long range at little more than merchant speeds, with ability to increase speed if necessary, would seem more economical. However, cruisers which can hunt surface raiders, can also be surface raiders. The Royal Navy certainly believed in convoys, it knew its opponents may as well – or they may not, either way Britain’s weakness, was the world’s weakness, whether Japan, Germany, Italy or the USA, all potential threats, allies and complications were exposed to sea for the movement of critical goods. This was not just external goods, but internal ones as well.

With a world dependent upon sea trade, ships which could fulfil both the roles of shield and spear in economic warfare were of critical value. So it would seem strange that the RN approached them in such an apparently apathetic manner; key figures often suggesting the class was too big, used too much treaty tonnage for too little fighting value and that they were only building them due to the size inflation of other navies. These public pronouncements need to be considered alongside the fact that baring the County class heavy cruisers, the Town class were the most prolific of the RN’s pre-war cruiser construction. That the RN bestowed the Town class names on them and built them in yards near key impoverished constituencies – making them virtually impossible for any government to cancel. Finally, when built they were almost immediately deployed to the Indian Ocean and China Squadron – critical forces for conflict deterrence and empire security. So why the contrast between deeds and words?

Well it comes down to the fact the RN and Admiralty of the 1930s often knew more about the wider world than the governments they served, knowing just how to play the politics. They needed to publicise they were getting these ships, they needed that to burnish the image that would help with deterrence. However, they could not trumpet them, lest they become seen as too much of a threat and so would shift from potential conflict safety valve to open naval race ignition, if not worse. So the navy had to play them down, had to use the controversy caused by the dissenting opinions to provide stories for the press, whilst their name would hopefully protect them from any change in government or spending. Their chosen methodology worked almost too well – as a consequence securing a tradition of place names for major warships ever since. At the time, though the success was that because everyone would know of them, would be suitably impressed/worried about them, no one would be surprised by them – so no destabilising knee-jerk reactions or crash builds.

The reality of their role is seen though best in the last of the Pre-War North Sea exercises, it was during this that the Town class vessels were positioned as the aggressor, the surface raider, to dance around the fleet and enable it to refine its counter raider methodology whilst also providing experience should they need to employ raider methodology. The Town class provided four of its members for the exercised; HMS Sheffield (10^th Cruiser Squadron) on the Red Fleet (Defending) was allowed to go 31 knots for the exercise, whilst her sisters HMS Glasgow, HMS Southampton and HMS Newcastle (all of the 2^nd Cruiser Squadron) serving with the Blue fleet (Attacking) were limited to 26 knots.¹ The only ships allowed to go faster were the Tribal and other Destroyer Flotillas of Red which were limited to 35 knots, along with the smallest light cruisers which were limited to 32knots – although in practical terms due to weather limitations that would be unlikely to confer any advantages.²

Sheffield certainly achieved Most Valued Player Status for the Red Fleet, accounting for the light cruiser HMS Aurora and proving the most stubborn obstacle, other than aircraft patrols (although of course Sheffield carried her own aircraft compliment) to the escape of the Blue Fleet surface raiders.¹ HMS Glasgow got away though to raid with impunity, having cracked on the speed and using her own aircraft to ‘dodge’ enemy, whilst using manoeuvre/firepower/sheer speed to prevent air attacks stopping her.¹ This was good news for a navy which was not only in the process of doubling down on the class, by building the enhanced/enlarged HMS Edinburgh sub-class, but which was looking at tripling down with what would be the Crown Colony Class.

North Sea/North Atlantic Patrol – economic warfare with added raiders

When war broke out in September 1939, HMS Edinburgh was at Scapa Flow, a critical member of 18^th Cruiser Squadron, formed there under the command of the Home Fleet’s Rear Admiral Destroyers into a force combined with the 6^th Destroyer Flotilla (Tribal Class vessels with HMS Somali as the Flotilla Leader) & 8^th Destroyer Flotilla (‘F’ Class vessels with HMS Faulknor as the Flotilla Leader).³ Edinburgh was critical to this force, not just for her twelve 6in guns or impressive size, the fact that she was one of the twenty of twenty-two vessels to carry Asdic or even one of the five vessels to have a catapult with aircraft loaded; she was critical because she was all these things.⁴ As such she was very in demand and would be sortieing regularly, the Home Fleet Commander in Chief, Sir Charles Forbes, remarking about the destroyer fleet that she operated alongside:

All classes of ships have kept the sea for a greater number of days per month than ever before since the advent of steam. The average has been in the region of 23 days per month. The weather experienced in northern waters from October onwards can only be described as foul; one gale has followed another with monotonous frequency. On the whole, machinery and boilers have stood the strain remarkably well and great credit is due to the engine room complements for this. It can also be said that the hulls of the ships have come through the test well…⁵

The cruisers of 18^th Squadron were at this point in 1939 arguably the second most important cruiser squadron the RN had, the first being 5^th squadron who were charged with keeping Japan from flaring to badly whilst there was the crisis in Europe.³ 18^th Squadron as well as being the muscle for the North Sea/North Atlantic barrier patrol, were the first line of defence against North Atlantic Surface raiders – for which they were on constant watch. During their time on this patrol the major threat was of course submarine, but actual fighting was more often than not with HE-111 bombers, sometimes attacking from high level, as a rule though acting as dive bombers.⁶ It was though May 1941 which brought forth the highlight of this duty for Edinburgh, after going on patrol with her sisters, HMS Birmingham (of Tsingtao fame) and HMS Manchester intercepted the German Weather Ship Munchen.⁷ There is also a nice link with the Tribal class in this story, as it was HMS Somali which provided the prize crew for the captured vessel, which was basically a converted trawler, whilst the enemy crew were accommodated aboard Edinburgh.⁸ This event though was a fitting end for Vice Admiral Holland, who’d been flying his flag aboard Edinburgh, but would not leave to become V.Adm of the Battlecruiser Squadron –hoisting his flag aboard HMS Hood.⁶ His command would last 14 days, but due to circumstances of fate his old ship would only play a peripheral part in the events that transpired.

On the 22^nd of May Edinburgh had another strange experience, this time with the SS Lech, a German merchant ship which had decided to try to make it home from Rio de Janeiro; when they saw the British cruiser, they abandoned their ship and blew it up – Edinburgh rescued the crew.⁹ This though meant that when V.Adm Holland, aboard HMS Hood, accompanied by HMS Prince of Wales, confronted the Bismarck and the Prinz Eugen, Edinburgh was in the mid-Atlantic, well to the west of Ireland – in fact would only be able to join the battleship HMS Rodney in the South-Western Approaches two days later.¹⁰ She was there on the 27^th of May when the signal was received, “Bismarck sunk”, Edinburgh would continue to operate in the North Atlantic for a few more weeks, but with a new admiral, Rear Admiral Syfret coming aboard, the threat of Bismarck gone, she was soon to be bound for another critical theatre of war – the Mediterranean.¹¹

HMS Edinburgh

Resupply of Malta

Operation Substance was a WWII convoy to resupply Malta undertaken in July 1941, when the war in that theatre had not yet reached the vicious peak of Pedestal, Torch and other events of 1942 – but crucially after the battle of Cape Spartivento the previous year, when the Italian fleet had sallied forth and really worried the British.¹² If such had happened again, then HMS Edinburgh, being the command ship of the convoy full journey task force (‘Force X’), would have no doubt been at front. However, this convoy was fated though to be no clash of titanic fleets, although still merely getting to the Narrows would cost the RN, a destroyer, HMS Fearless sunk, another, Firedrake damaged and an earlier Town class cruiser, HMS Manchester damaged – all through air attacks.¹³ This is what led to HMS Cossack filling in for Firedrake at the front of the convoy and Hermione replacing Manchester as part of the final group. At several times bombs dropped close to HMS Edinburgh, but she bore up to it well, her 4in HA guns especially assisting in disrupting air attacks; but it wasn’t the persistent air threat which proved the most dangerous to the convoy.

On the night of the 23^rd/24^th July between 02:15hrs & 03:15hrs, the convoy was attacked by a pair of torpedo boats (some British estimates during the night were of six boats), which had loitered in front of the convoy before going to high speed to make runs through the convoy.¹³ They were successful, they struck the SS Sydney Star – the second of the convoy’s six merchant ships to be damaged during the operation; all would reach Malta though, due to a combination of good damage control and failure by the Italians to build on successes. What’s interesting about this attack also is that the boat which torpedoed the Sydney Star, was prior to that lit up by search lights from Cossack and Edinburgh, they were joined by Manxman in firing – all to no avail.¹³

After the attacks, after the convoy was over there was a distinct difference in the way the younger, more institutionally aggressive destroyer commanders viewed the evidence from the fight in contrast to Rear Admiral Syfret; especially when considering their often inability to fire for fear of hitting an allied ship. The former felt they should have been forward, to give them more room for manoeuvre, as well as allowing for offensive patrolling for these boats and destroy them before they got in range. In contrast Syfret wanted them closer to the convoy to make it harder for a boat to get between them and the convoy. ¹³ Whatever the case, he would find himself no longer in command of the escort when Operation Halberd took place – Rear Admiral Borough being placed in command. ¹³

Operation Halberd was in many ways a rerun of Operation Substance, but with an even stronger escort – why? It was due to Italian activity having grown substantially, what’s more is the RN were proved correct in their assumptions when this time the Regina Marina didn’t stay in port.¹⁴ This time though not only was Force “X” to be commanded by a different officer, Rear Admiral Borough, his flagship was the Crown Colony (emergency evolved Town class) class cruiser HMS Kenya. The advantages of this arrangement were simple, with the return to dimensions closer to Edinburgh’s preceding Town class sisters, whilst retaining as much power as possible, the RN had produced arguably one of the bet lb for £ warships ever built. What is more it’s reduced size in comparison, made Kenya harder to hit by enemy air attacks – which again, in harbinger of things to come, would prove the consistent threat throughout the journey.

What is interesting also is the heavy escort a boosted Force H provide for the first phase of the convoy, not only HMS Ark Royal, but also the sister battleships HMS Nelson & HMS Rodney, each with nine 16in guns (each individually arguably the most powerful unit in the RN at the time), plus a pretty new King George V class battleship, HMS Prince of Wales with her ten 14in guns. ¹⁴ In addition both Force H & Force X between them had 18 Destroyers (including 2 Tribal class and 6 “L” class vessels – the largest destroyers available) and three more cruisers in addition to Edinburgh & Kenya which have already been mentioned there was HMS Sheffield (Town class), and the Dido class vessels HMS Euryalus & HMS Hermione acting as escort for the carrier. This was a mighty force, and as said the Italians came out – but due to interpretation of orders to “engage only in conditions of decisive superiority”, Admiral Iachino (the Italian commander) pulled away.

Once again an Axis commander was prevented from being able to achieve anything by their political leadership’s fear of losing equipment which was seen as critical mediums of status – in simple terms their own fear rendered powerful tools of national might & realpolitik into white-elephants. Later Admiral Somerville would alder the same because he believed his pursuit force couldn’t catch up in time. So in the end there was no battle, and Force X would proceed to Malta, all five cruisers, nine destroyers (including both Tribals & two “L”s) escorting their nine precious merchant ships: a ratio of almost 3 escorts to 2 merchants – a ratio which would have been a dream come true in the Arctic convoys which would be the principle theme in the next phase of Edinburgh’s life story.¹⁴

HMS Edinburgh

Arctic Convoys – Ice, Ice, Ice everywhere and a gold laced demise

HMS Edinburgh of course was famously lost on an arctic convoy, QP11 a return trip from Murmansk to Iceland – but this was by no means her only trip, in fact even before PQ14 (the trip out prior to the ill-fated QP11), this doughty vessel had already led a successful out and back, PQ6 and QP4. This prior trip has been relatively straight forward as arctic convoys go; in fact it could almost have been termed peaceful. The only real difficulty had been caused by the SS Mirlo (listed in some places as the El Mirlo, but after checking it myself I’m convinced by the work of Siri Lawson¹⁵), which had been a constant source of issues – right to the end where it was lost, so a destroyer, HMS Escapade, had to be sent to find her, only for them to get to the port and realise she’d arrived before them.¹⁶ Whilst the convoy had been relatively simple, what had been going around it suggested that would not continue – German Destroyers engaging in battles with British Minesweepers, air attacks having to be fought off by joint Anglo-Russian actions (sometimes including Russian flown Hurricane fighters).¹⁷ It was not always to be so.

PQ14 started off very differently, to start with there was the necessity to load supplies for the repair of HMS Trinidad, sister of Edinburgh’s old friend from Operation Halberd HMS Kenya, who had torpedoed herself whilst defending PQ13 from an attack by the German destroyer, Z26.¹⁸ Edinburgh which had been pulling covering force rather than convoy duties up until now, was not only going on a convoy, but in April 1942 it would be laden with materials to fix another cruiser and making the transit during weeks of constant daylight.¹⁹ Leaving Reykjavik on the 8^th of April, it was peaceful for a while, but on the 15^th the convoy was spotted by a scout and from then on the air attacks began; on the 16^th they co-ordinated with U-Boats, making the escort very hard pressed very quickly.²⁰

It was though the latter which would account for the convoy’s only loss, the Commodore’s Ship, the Empire Howard, hit by torpedoes from the U403 – she was carrying ammunition and the result of one of the impacts cleaved the vessel in two; due to a combination of cold and depth-charges, only nine of the crew lived – the Commodore, Captain E. Rees RNR, wasn’t one of them.²¹ German destroyers would also play their part, in fact Rear Admiral Bonham-Carter on the 18^th at 02:00hrs would take his flagship, Edinburgh, out of the convoy and confront two such would be attackers flying full battle ensigns – these vessels retreated before violent contact could be made.²² On the 19^th though the convoy made it to Kildin Island and the relative safety of the inlet.

With the convoy safe Edinburgh’s special duties were not over, once the offload of materials for Trinidad was completed she was then loaded with gold – lots of it. In fact it was 5 tons of Soviet Gold Bullion destined for the US Treasury to pay for arms. It was crudely covered in red markings to make it look like ammunition, unfortunately this paint washed off leading some to describe it as dripping with blood and an ill-omen of what was to come.²³ Although her special cargo also included people, for example a Polish Government Cabinet Minister, a Czechoslovakian Army Colonel and three Russian Navy officers; by virtue of all this, despite the German’s apparently not knowing it, Edinburgh was raised from an important target to a very important target. So it was definitely a case of ‘Fortunes of war’ when Edinburgh’s luck started to run out at 16:07 on the 30^th of April 1942, when two(out of three) torpedoes fired from U-456 (Kapitanleutnant Max Tiechert), hit home; another four fired from U-88 missed entirely.²⁴

The hit’s did not sink the cruiser though, Edinburgh was like all her sisters a tough ship – testimony to both their design and the quality of construction British yards had achieved; moreover she was equipped with a well-trained, determined and resourceful crew – who more than anything were not prepared to let their ship die, they loved her, she was their home, their best lifeboat, they knew this and they put in the effort for it. As a result, it would take nearly 64hrs in total – nearly three days that would encompass a lot. For starters another enemy torpedo fired by a destroyer, causing more damage and leading to fear of her being captured by the enemy.²⁵ This fear and constant daylight making air attacks incredibly dangerous led to the decision to abandon her. So consequently the removal of her crew, a British torpedo, multiple depth charges and lots of 4in shells all were used before she would sink.

Summary – it’s a cruisers life…

HMS Edinburgh had a hard war, no cruiser had an easy one, but she certainly had a hard one – from day one, from September 1^st let alone September 3^rd 1939 she was on duty, through turbulent, almost tobleronish, northern waters, to vicious hard fought Malta convoys, then Icy journeys which demanded everything of ship and crew, which eventually consumed her – along with so many others. So what are the lessons to be learned from her & her career? Ships are not built to sit in harbour doing nothing – they are things to be used; for a warship to be used it will eventually be risked by necessity of circumstance. A warship which is never risked is a warship which has either never seen war or has been used so cautiously as to might as well not have been.

Edinburgh was of course definitely risked and certainly used, she achieved a lot – far more than can be covered in this short paper; the lesson though is not her career, it’s that the RN were prepared to use, to risk this valuable unit, but had taken steps to have replacements for if the worst did happen. The Crown Colonies were in production, what is today a struggle to generate a frigate factory, in WWII the RN was benefiting from having kept multiple yards working as effective cruiser and destroyer factories even during the financially stringent inter-war years.

Edinburgh never got to be a cruiser in ‘peace-time’, so can only really be judged on its fulfilment of the war time functions – being the ‘enforcer’ escort, the picket, the on the fiery edge staring into the ‘whites of the enemy’s eyes’, whether they be pilots, submarine periscopes or warship Captains. As this paper, short as it has admittedly been, has demonstrated, Edinburgh was certainly good for these. As war evolves, as the distances expand and the speed of engagement escalate, the relevance of this experience can seem to be less relevant, when actually it is more than ever.

War is still a psychological experience, which requires all from all members of a crew, one side of this is they have to have faith in their ship, in their systems, in themselves and most importantly each other if they are to succeed; the other side of this is that the ‘personal’ part of war, the competition (for want of a better word) with an enemy has moved from the visual range into ‘imagination’, where all that might ever been seen of the other side is their weapons. This is different, but it still requires the same commitment from the crew, the same steadfastness, the same challenges for officers to take care of and motivate there personnel. For all this, the history of HMS Edinburgh is of enormous use.

HMS Edinburgh

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1. (TNA – ADM 1/9845, 1938)
2. (TNA – ADM 1/9845, 1938) – Interesting to note that the RN in this exercises is building a fleet around the concept of having far more than two Tribal destroyer flotillas at its disposal…
3. (TNA – ADM 187/1, 1939)
4. (TNA – ADM 187/1, 1939) – in addition it tells us that HMS Edinburgh’s crew came from Devonport, she was a Plymouth home base ship.
5. (Smith, 2004, p. 34)
6. (McCart, 2012, p. 256)
7. (McCart, 2012, p. 256; Clarke, 2019)
8. (McCart, 2012, p. 256; Clarke, 2017)
9. (McCart, 2012, p. 257)
10. (McCart, 2012, p. 257; Kennedy, 1974; TNA – ADM 367/137, 1941; TNA – ADM 234/510, 1941; TNA – ADM 234/509, 1941)
11. (McCart, 2012, pp. 257-8; Britannia Naval Histories of World War II, 2013)
12. (TNA – ADM 234/325, 1943; TNA – ADM 234/326, 1947; Clarke, 2019)
13. (Britannia Naval Histories of World War II, 2013, pp. 51-67)
14. (Britannia Naval Histories of World War II, 2013, pp. 68-88)
15. (Lawson, 2006)
16. (Woodman, 2007, p. 51)
17. (Woodman, 2007, pp. 48-51)
18. (Woodman, 2007, pp. 93-5)
19. (Woodman, 2007, pp. 103-5)
20. (Woodman, 2007, p. 105)
21. (Woodman, 2007, pp. 105-6)
22. (Woodman, 2007, p. 106)
23. (Woodman, 2007, p. 130)
24. (Woodman, 2007, p. 125)
25. (Woodman, 2007, pp. 125-36)